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Workplace Safety Policy:
Past, Present, and Future
“We sent our associate Vicki Warren to work
undercover at the Washington Regional Bulk Mail
Center, and when she saw the appalling conditions
the facility’s employees must work in, she asked
them why they didn’t quit. The universal response
was that the pay was too good to pass up. The postal
workers are, in effect, being paid to risk life and
limb.” Jack Anderson, Washington Post, March 7,
1979.
In 1997, 6,218 workers in the United States died from an accident
on the job and another 1,833,400 were hurt seriously enough to
require at least one day away from work to recuperate. We all
want fewer work-related injuries and diseases. How can we
design the best public policy to reduce them?
Introduction
In 1970 Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act
to assure safe and healthful working conditions for
working men and women; by authorizing
enforcement of the standards developed under the
Act; by assisting and encouraging the States in their
efforts to assure safe and healthful working
conditions; by providing for research, information,
education, and training in the field of occupational
safety and health, and for other purposes.
To carry out OSHA’s functions, Congress created
• the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
commonly known as OSHA, to: promulgate occupational
safety and health standards; conduct worker education
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programs about workplace hazards; inspect work sites under
its jurisdiction; investigate complaints by workers; cite
employers for noncompliance with OSHA standards; and
enforce compliance by levying fines. If a work site is so
hazardous that workers are in “imminent danger” of death or
serious physical harm, the Secretary of OSHA can petition in
U.S. district court to effectively shut down the work site until
the danger has been removed. There are also criminal
sanctions for willful violation of OSHA standards,
unauthorized notice of an upcoming inspection, or falsifying
business records required by OSHA.
• the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), to gather information and conduct scientific
research about workplace injuries and illnesses. NIOSH is
now part of the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control
(CDC).
• and the National Commission on State Workmen’s
Compensation Laws, which evaluated the adequacy, equity,
and timeliness of the state Workers’ Compensation (WC) laws
then in effect.
With an annual budget of about $400 million, OSHA is about 5
percent the size of the Environmental Protection Agency, another
federal agency created by President Richard M. Nixon in 1970,
the “Year of the Environment.” Nearly all workers in the United
States come under OSHA’s jurisdiction, with some notable
exceptions, including miners, transportation workers, many
public employees, and people who are self-employed. OSHA is
currently responsible for protecting over 100 million workers at 6
million work sites with the help of only about 2,000 workplace
health and safety inspectors. Nevertheless, supporters of OSHA
argue that it has significantly improved worker safety over the
last 30 years and that a beefed-up enforcement effort would
produce even greater improvements.
We examine the available evidence and find little support to the
notion that OSHA has effectively reduced accidents and diseases
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in the workplace or that a more vigorous enforcement campaign
would be likely to do so. Other policy instruments—tort laws,
state Workers’ Compensation insurance programs, and research
and public education on the causes and consequences of work
hazards—now keep workplace deaths and injuries low and can
reduce them even more. The wage premiums alluded to by Jack
Anderson above, estimated at $210 billion per year, that workers
receive for accepting job-related health hazards give employers a
stronger economic incentive to eliminate workplace health and
safety hazards than the $132 million per year in fines imposed by
OSHA and its state counterparts for violations of workplace
safety standards. Because of the heterogeneity of workers and
firms, we argue that public policy should expand the economic
incentives for workplace safety while allowing firms and workers
freedom to discover on their own the best ways to improve
workplace safety.
The Failure of OSHA
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, workers at the Pymm
Thermometer Corporation in Brooklyn, New York, the second
largest manufacturer of mercury thermometers in the United
States, had no respirators or protective clothing and worked in a
building with little outside ventilation. Worst of all were the
conditions in a windowless room in the cellar where people
recycled mercury from old thermometers. The mercury recycling
room was filled with broken glass and noxious fumes from
puddles of mercury on the floor. Exposure to mercury can
permanently damage vital internal organs such as the brain,
lungs, liver, and kidneys.
OSHA originally cited Pymm in 1981 for mercury fume levels
five times greater than normal, a level possibly causing severe
neurological damage or death. The agency fined Pymm $1,400
and ordered it to eliminate the mercury fume hazard within six
months. Five years after the original elimination order, by which
time three additional OSHA inspections had taken place, the
company still had not installed the ventilation equipment
necessary to reduce mercury exposure to permissible levels. And
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until a former employee tipped off the inspectors, OSHA was
unaware of the mercury recycling room.
The Pymm situation would have continued unchanged, but in
1985 an employee named Vidal Rodriguez broke his elbow at
work. After doctors treated Mr. Rodriguez’s elbow, they reported
to the health departments of both New York City and New York
State that Mr. Rodriguez suffered from mercury poisoning. An
asthmatic who was no longer able to walk without a cane, Mr.
Rodriguez applied for Workers’ Compensation benefits and was
quickly fired by Pymm. Newspaper accounts of Mr. Rodriguez’s
case described city and state health departments’ concerns over
the working conditions at Pymm. The New York City Health
Department examined 64 Pymm workers and found mercury
levels in the “hazardous” range in about one-third of them, and
elevated levels in six workers’ children. OSHA still did nothing.
Eventually an article describing the agency’s dismal enforcement
record goaded OSHA into re-inspecting Pymm.
Mr. Rodriguez, who lived only one block from the thermometer
plant, met the safety inspectors on the street and described the
basement mercury recycling operation. Safety inspectors
searched the building for more than a day to find the hidden
room. Then, although the inspectors said that the working
conditions were a “nightmare,” they fined Pymm only $30,100
for 16 violations of federal workplace safety and health
standards. A year later, two months after a New York City grand
jury indicted Pymm and its owners for criminal assault for
exposing workers to the high mercury levels, OSHA again
inspected the plant and issued another $75,000 in citations. Yet it
was not OSHA but rather the cumulative impact of criminal
prosecution, civil litigation by other workers, an eviction
proceeding by the owner of the building (ironically, the City of
New York) that finally closed Pymm Thermometer Corporation a
few years later.
As we have just seen, OSHA inspectors are often reluctant to
initiate actions to close down a company or even to impose
dramatic fines when they find serious violations of health and
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safety standards. Other case histories underscore that the situation
at the Pymm Thermometer Corporation was far from unique.
OSHA inspectors frequently overlook dangerous working
conditions and, even when they find serious health and safety
violations, inspectors often cannot compel firms to eliminate the
hazards discovered. To encourage firms to comply,
administrators often slash assessed penalties, which further
reduces the already small economic incentives to observe health
and safety standards. Firms realize that in the unlikely event they
are inspected (recent inspection rates mean that the typical
American worker can expect to see an OSHA inspector once
every 75 years, or once every 13 years if working in a hazardous
job), they can avoid paying meaningful fines by simply agreeing
to abide by OSHA’s regulations in the future. It is fortunate that
OSHA is neither the only nor the main pillar of the U.S.
workplace safety policy system.
Overview of the U.S. Workplace Safety Policy
System
OSHA is the most recently constructed pillar of the U.S. safety
policy system, which includes the body of tort laws, state
Workers’ Compensation insurance programs, and the research
and public education programs of NIOSH. Reinforcing the four
pillars of safety policy are the labor market forces establishing
the wage premiums, known as compensating wage differentials,
that workers receive for accepting job-related health hazards.
Government safety policy has evolved over time in response to
the perceived deficiencies of each previous effort. The initial
common law tort system was largely supplanted by states’
Workers’ Compensation legislation on the grounds that the
determination of negligence by courts after the fact left too many
workers uncompensated for injury and created too much
uncertainty regarding payment of damages. In the 1960s, the
purchasing power of Workers’ Compensation benefits was
eroded by inflation, which outpaced legislated benefit increases.
Public Finance Policy Brief
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The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 also led to the
formation of the National Commission on State Workmens’
Compensation Laws, which then encouraged states to modify
their WC programs and raise their income replacement benefits.
The ultimate increases in benefits have raised the cost of buying
WC coverage and may have resulted in increased filing of
fraudulent benefit claims. Concern over cost containment and
safety incentives in the workplace health and safety system are
larger today than at any time in recent memory.
Workplace Fatalities
Figure 1 shows that the frequency of workplace deaths has
declined dramatically over the past 65 years. In 1933, for every
100,000 workers there were about 37 workplace fatalities. By
1993 the rate of fatalities had fallen about 80 percent, to 8 per
100,000 workers. The trend line in Figure 1 stops in 1993
because the National Safety Council quit independently
calculating workplace fatalities and began relying, instead, on
estimates drawn from annual censuses of fatal occupational
injuries conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). For
1997 the BLS estimated that the average worker in the United
0
10
20
30
40
50
33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93
Year
37
8
Death Rate
(Per 100,000 Workers)
Pre-OSHA Post-OSHA
18
Figure 1.  Workplace Fatalities, 1933-1993 (Source:  National 
Safety Council.  Accident Facts, 1994 Edition ,  Itasca, Il: Author.)
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States faced a 5 in 100,000 chance of dying in a work-related
accident. As points of reference, the National Safety Council
estimated that in 1997 the chance of dying in an accident at home
was two times greater (10 in 100,000 annually) and the chance of
dying in a motor vehicle accident was over three times greater
(16 in 100,000 annually) than the chance of dying in an accident
at work.
The two leading causes of work-related deaths in recent years are
unlikely to be reduced much by OSHA inspections. Over 40
percent of recent workplace fatalities were from transportation
accidents (almost half the fatal transportation accidents occurred
on the highway), and about 17 percent of workplace fatalities
were from intentional assaults and suicides (for more on “The
Changing Character of Fatal Work Injuries” see Toscano and
Windau 1994).
Self-employed workers, who are exempt from OSHA
jurisdiction, face a much higher chance of dying at work than
wage and salary workers, which also has consequences for the
effectiveness of OSHA. Although about 9 percent of the
workforce is self-employed, they suffered about 20 percent of all
workplace fatalities. Differences between the occupational
distributions of self-employed and wage and salary workers
partially explains the higher fatality rate; compared to wage and
salary workers the self-employed are more likely to work in
agriculture and construction, relatively high-risk industries, and
are less likely to work in manufacturing, a relatively low-risk
industry. Self-employed workers are also more likely to be
managers of food serving and lodging facilities, and sales
supervisors and proprietors, which are occupations where the risk
of being a homicide victim during a robbery is high.
Nonfatal Workplace Injuries and Illnesses
Figure 2 shows nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses since
1973, which is the first year firms were required to report
industrial accidents and diseases. Unlike death rates, injuries and
illnesses do not show a marked decline over time. Until the 1990s
Public Finance Policy Brief
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the pattern of nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses followed
the business cycle closely. Injuries and illnesses rose slightly
during the business upturn of the late 1970s, fell during the
recession of the early 1980s, and then rose again during the
1980s’ macroeconomic expansion. Injuries and illnesses fell
during the early 1990s recession and continued to decline even
during the business boom of the late 1990s.
Because the rate of workplace deaths has, in fact, fallen by about
half since 1970, from 18 per 100,000 workers in 1970 to 8 per
100,000 workers in 1993, OSHA takes credit for reducing
workplace fatalities by 57 percent. Figure 1 shows that the
workplace fatality rate began its downward trend well before
OSHA, partly fueled by improvements in safety technology and
changes in the occupational distribution of labor. To credit
OSHA with all the reduction in work-related fatal injuries since
1970 is also misleading. Figure 2 shows no downward trend in
either the total frequency of workplace injuries or the frequency
of illnesses resulting in at least one lost workday.
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Figure 2.  Workplace Injuries and Illnesses, 1973-1998 (Source:  
U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA, “Occupational Injury and 
Illness Incidence Rates per 100 Full-Time Workers, 1973-98(2),” 
at http://www.osha.gov/oshstats/bltable.html.)
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To get a truer picture of OSHA’s impact on workplace health and
safety, one must control for factors unrelated to OSHA that also
affect industrial accidents and diseases. Numerous sophisticated
econometric studies have attempted to isolate the effect of OSHA
on workplace safety (see Chapter 2 of Kniesner and Leeth 1995a
for a review of the research). Although OSHA’s supporters cite a
few studies suggesting that the agency improves workplace
safety, the vast majority of studies have found no statistically
significant reduction in the rate of workplace fatalities or injuries
due to OSHA. It is thus hard to conclude that OSHA has had any
desirable effect on the problem it is supposed to solve.
OSHA is ineffective not because its budget is too small or
because it has too few safety and health inspectors. A comparison
of the United States and Canada indicates the likely impact of
strengthening OSHA enforcement powers. The Canadian system
of worker protection against injury is stronger than in the United
States. For instance, Quebec province allows workers to refuse
hazardous tasks, requires firms to establish joint workplace safety
committees with labor, and makes firms initiate accident
prevention programs. The Commission de la Santé et de la
Sécurité du Travail, Quebec’s equivalent of OSHA, also spends
over four times more per worker in prevention activities than
OSHA. Even with more innovative safety measures and a much
greater level of enforcement, the Quebec system of workplace
regulation has been no more successful than OSHA in improving
worker safety and health (Lanoie 1992).
The Future of Workplace Safety and Health Policy
Ignoring the mountain of evidence concerning the cost
ineffectiveness of the regulatory approach to workplace safety as
practiced by OSHA or whether it is even proper to hold OSHA to
the economic standard of cost effectiveness, the fact is that
OSHA as conceived in 1970 is withering away. Since 1980 the
real per worker expenditure on safety standards enforcement by
OSHA at both the state and federal levels has fallen by a third.
Because the political process is downsizing OSHA at a fairly
rapid pace it seems fruitful to discuss some future directions for
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the other three pillars of workplace safety policy in the United
States—tort laws, Workers’ Compensation, and research and
training about workplace hazards—which will continue to be
supplemented by the sizable incentives for workplace safety that
the labor market creates on its own in the form of compensating
wage differentials for accidents and health hazards.
Workers’ Compensation Insurance and Experience Rating
Among other things, the Clinton Administration’s failed
healthcare reform proposal would have supplanted the state
system of Workers’ Compensation benefits with federalized
medical benefits for workplace accidents and diseases. From the
standpoint of workplace safety policy it is fortunate that their
initiative failed because it would have reduced the safety
incentives of Workers’ Compensation by eliminating the current
experience rating of WC premiums. By experience rating we
mean the process of adjusting insurance prices to reflect
individual versus group claims experience. As an example, car
insurance is experience rated. The more traffic accidents a person
has the more that individual driver will pay for car insurance.
Currently, insurance providers completely experience rate WC
premiums for only the largest establishments. Very small firms
are not experience rated at all, which means that their individual
workplace safety record has no impact on the price they pay for
WC insurance. Some researchers suggest that the lack of
complete experience rating contributes to the positive
relationship generally observed between injury rates and WC
benefit generosity (Ruser 1985).
On a theoretical basis, it is unclear whether higher WC benefits
increase or decrease worker safety. Higher benefits reduce the
monetary cost to workers from injury and may encourage them to
accept greater hazards on the job. Additionally, workers may be
more likely to report accidents and diseases and file claims for
disability benefits when benefits are high, so that, even if WC
had no influence on workers’ acceptance of risk, the rising
incentive to file a WC claim would cause a positive relationship
between benefits and reported injuries. On the other side of the
Kniesner and Leeth
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market, if insurance prices are suitably experience rated then
higher WC benefits increase firms’ incentives to provide safe
workplaces. The net impact of WC benefits on workplace safety
depends on whether workers or firms respond more greatly to
more generous insurance coverage, and the response of firms
depends crucially on the degree of experience rating of insurance
premiums.
Numerically Simulating Safety Policy Outcomes
To examine the impact of experience rating we developed a
numerical simulation model of labor, insurance, and product
markets. By using numerical simulation, we have developed a
framework capable of providing an integrated quantitative look at
how workers, employers, state governments, and the federal
government interact to produce a safe, or in many cases unsafe,
working environment. It is impossible to do justice here to the
many technical details involved in numerically simulating
workplace safety outcomes or to examine an exhaustive set of
possible public policy actions. Our book, Simulating Workplace
Safety Policy (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), sets out the
details and examines U.S. safety policy in depth. It provides a
comprehensive overview of how the U.S. economic system, as
tempered by government policy, jointly determines employment
patterns, wages, and workplace safety levels and how numerical
simulations are a research complement to econometric
estimation.
Let us now summarize briefly how we use numerical simulation
to clarify interactions among workers, employers, and
policymakers to understand their connections to workplace safety
when there is a Workers’ Compensation insurance system
involved. The simulations we describe not only support the
qualitative conclusion that greater experience rating of Workers’
Compensation insurance premiums increases workplace safety
but also produce a quantitative impact of experience rating on
worker safety in the United States.
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Our approach to examining the issue of improving workplace
safety in the United States is unique. Building on recent
theoretical research on how best to describe the economic
interactions among many heterogeneous workers and employers,
we have developed a numerical description of a labor market
where workplaces vary by level of safety and workers vary in
their willingness to accept injury risk. Numerical simulation is
useful because it allows one to see clearly the avenues through
which changes in WC generosity or premium pricing operate to
affect workers and their well-being.
Figure 3 presents an overview of the numerical model we have
developed and used to guide much of our research on the
economics of safety in the workplace. Note the integrated
depiction of the linkages among the labor, product, and insurance
markets as tempered by government intervention, reflecting
safety policy intended to alter labor market outcomes. Unlike
other treatments, we realistically allow workers to have differing
views about risk and firms to have differing capabilities to
produce a safe working environment. Firms unwilling or unable
to eliminate all job hazards pay higher wages to attract workers
away from firms offering more or complete safety.
Changes in safety policy alter workers’ and firms’ decisions
regarding workplace hazards, in turn reconfiguring the labor
market outcomes in Figure 3. In particular, the resulting change
in wages creates feedback effects that either reinforce or
counteract the direct effects of government programs
encouraging safety. Feedback effects occur both within the labor
market and between the labor market and other institutions, such
as the market for disability insurance. Safety decisions influence
the number of WC claims and ultimately the price of WC
premiums. Likewise, safety decisions influence production costs
and therefore the prices of goods and services. To capture the full
set of subtle and not so subtle counterbalancing effects from
government policy intended to increase workplace safety, our
numerical model examines the complete set of interactions
among the labor, insurance, and product markets using what
economists currently know quantitatively.
Kniesner and Leeth
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Figure 3. Safety Policy Interactions
Numerical Details of the Simulation Model
Any method used to solve for labor market outcomes requires
specific algebraic equations to represent (i) workers’ preferences,
also known as utility or well-being, (ii) employers’ costs of
producing their product, (iii) the cost and effectiveness of safety
measures, and (iv) interpersonal and inter-firm differences in
attitudes toward risks to health. Figure 4 outlines the general
approach used to formalize the mathematical model.
The initial values in Figure 4 are the core set of numbers from
which we evaluate policy changes. After positing the initial
situation numerically we then chose specific equations to
represent how workers’ well-being depends on their income and
job safety, how firms use labor and other inputs to produce their
product, how firms can make the workplace safer, how workers
may differ among one another concerning their tolerance for an
unsafe workplace, and how firms may differ among one another
concerning their ability to make the workplace safer. We used the
simplest algebraic equations that are consistent with economic
theory. In giving quantitative content to the algebraic expressions
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in our simulation model we relied as much as possible on existing
econometric research. Our choices of structural equations and
initial parameter values are summarized and justified more fully
in Kniesner and Leeth (1995a, 1995c).
Calibration. As is typical in numerical simulation, one cannot find
every underlying initial numerical value needed by examining
existing empirical research. Little information is currently
available concerning the relationship between safety programs
Initial Values -
The Labor Market of
the Late 1960s
Choice of Structural Equations for:
(i) Expected Utility,
(ii) Output,
(iii) Production of Safety, and
(iv) Worker and Firm Heterogeneity
Specification of Exogenous
Parameters and Elasticity Values
Calibration to Reproduce
Initial Values
Replication
Check
Sensitivity
Analysis
Policy Change
New Equilibrium
Policy Appraisal
Further Policy
Changes
Evaluated
Replication
Check
E
X
I
T
Figure 4. Calibrating the Numerical Model
Kniesner and Leeth
15
and workplace safety, which is crucial to how the firm produces
its product and is an important topic for future research. As a
result of the lack of existing statistical research, we calibrated our
simulation model using the link between safety program
expenditures and workplace safety levels. Calibration means
using numerical values for a needed set of coefficients in an
algebraic expression so that the overall numerical model
reproduces a core set of outcomes. In choosing initial numerical
values for our simulation model we reproduced the particular set
of wages, employment, and workplace safety outcomes existing
before passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in
1970.
The Safety Effects of Experience Rating on Workers’
Compensation Insurance
WC insurance influences workplace safety in two conflicting
ways. Workers’ monetary concerns if they are injured are
reduced if they can expect to receive higher benefits for income
loss, which leads them to accept higher risk jobs. In the other
direction, higher WC benefits raise firms’ costs of workplace
injuries, which leads them to improve workplace safety. The
more closely insurance companies match WC premiums to
workplace safety, the greater are firms’ financial incentives to
provide safer work environments.
The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation
Laws recommended that insurance providers use experience
rating of WC premiums whenever feasible. Historically, WC
insurers have not used the accident experience of a small firm to
determine the cost of its WC insurance. Instead, insurers have
combined the injury statistics for all workers within an industrial
class and determined a so-called manual rate for WC coverage.
The product of each worker’s wage rate and the manual rate for
the worker’s industrial class summed over all workers determines
the total WC insurance premium for a small firm. As firm size
increases, insurers pay less attention to the average experience of
the industrial class (the manual rate) and more attention to the
safety record of the individual firm. Currently, insurance
Public Finance Policy Brief
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providers completely experience rate WC premiums for only the
largest firms.
Some researchers suggest that the lack of complete experience
rating contributes to the observation that injury rates are often
higher when WC benefits are greater (Ruser 1985). The argument
is that under incomplete experience rating, more generous
benefits may lead workers to be less careful, and in turn have
more accidents, because they have less to lose, and encourage
workers to file fraudulent claims or honest claims that were not
worth the effort to file when benefits were lower. At the same
time, the higher benefits do not create offsetting greater financial
incentives to firms to make the workplace safer because benefit
generosity is only poorly reflected in the insurance premium the
firms pay. However, even with grouped insurance rates, high-risk
firms still pay greater total WC insurance premiums than low-risk
firms because workplace hazards increase wages, thereby
increasing the cost of WC coverage. Higher rates of income
replacement then magnify the indirect influence of workplace
hazards on firms’ insurance costs.
To examine the impact of experience rating we recalculated the
outcomes in our numerical simulation model for the situation in
which insurance prices completely reflect the expected frequency
of injury for each employer. Complete experience rating
produces major differences in the calculated labor market effects
of WC benefits. Unlike in the base case of incomplete experience
rating, when there is complete experience rating of insurance
premiums, more generous WC benefits improve workplace
safety. Enhanced experience rating tightens the economic link
between WC benefits and firms’ cost of injuries, which moves
firms toward greater safety. Firms’ attempts to make the
workplace safer dominate any possible offsetting movement of
workers toward less safe jobs. Increasing WC benefits to the
level recommended by the National Commission on State
Workmen’s Compensation Laws reduces injuries by 8 percent. In
comparison, typical OSHA safety and health standards reduce
injuries by 0.3 percent. With complete experience rating of WC
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insurance premiums the safety enhancing effect of WC greatly
exceeds that of OSHA.
Summary. At over $50 billion, Workers’ Compensation insurance
is the most influential public policy currently promoting
workplace safety. The experience rating of insurance premiums
encourages firms to pursue efforts to assure a safe and healthy
work environment. Much like the pricing of auto insurance, as
the frequency of claims rises the price of insurance increases,
thereby penalizing firms for poor safety records. Estimates are
that Workers’ Compensation insurance has reduced fatal
accidents and diseases by 48 percent in the United States (Moore
and Viscusi 1990).
Our calculations demonstrate that the link between a firm’s safety
history and WC insurance premiums could be further
strengthened. Other than establishing separate risk pools for
small businesses and having insurance premiums better reflect
injury severity, though, there is little room to expand significantly
the experience rating of WC premiums.
Although more generous WC benefits for injured workers would
also encourage additional workplace safety, evidence indicates
that workers are currently satisfied with their WC coverage and
unwilling to pay for increased WC benefits (Moore and Viscusi
1990). Therefore, it seems unlikely that there will be a great push
for higher WC benefits in the immediate future.
Most states are looking for ways to revamp their WC programs
because of escalating costs. We expect WC to move toward
clarifying the link between premium levels and workplace safety.
Specifically, separating legitimate from illegitimate workplace
injury claims is a major problem now confronting WC programs
in most states as they struggle to control insurance premium
costs. Eliminating fraudulent claims would strengthen the safety
incentive in WC by making a closer link between firms’ actual
workplace safety and the insurance premiums they pay under
WC.
Public Finance Policy Brief
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The Legal System
Many workplace hazards are momentary and require employers
and workers to choose the correct course of action quickly to
avoid possible harm. Instead of relying on OSHA, policymakers
might give more thought to allowing workers to sue their
employers for clear-cut cases of negligence. With the no-fault
system stemming from WC now in effect, employers are liable
for only a portion of the total costs of injuries. Workers receive
compensation for medical expenses and income losses, but no
compensation for their pain and suffering. Because employers
will eliminate workplace hazards if the expected savings from
fewer injuries exceed the necessary financial outlays, employers
may spend too little for safety under the current limited liability
scheme. Permitting workers to sue for pain and suffering in
situations where employers show reckless disregard for worker
welfare would produce greater safety by making firms bear more
of the total costs of injuries.
One major outcome of the Pymm Thermometer Corporation
criminal prosecution is that it helped establish that state
prosecutors have the right to file criminal charges against
employers who endanger their workers, to protect citizens from
criminal conduct wherever it occurs; Congress intended to allow
states to supplement OSHA civil penalties with their own
punishment; and nothing in OSHA precludes enforcement of
state criminal laws to address workplace safety. More generally,
evidence from product liability settlements suggests that awards
for pain and suffering have the effect of deterring injuries
(Viscusi 1991). On the negative side, additional legal actions
against employers for work-related injuries will increase
administrative and court expenses and add uncertainty to
compensation for injured workers. To minimize the legal costs,
worker suits could be strictly limited to cases of gross or
intentional employer misconduct.
Kniesner and Leeth
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Labor Market Incentives to Workplace Safety
Empirical studies show wages rise with increases in workplace
risk. All else equal, the typical U.S. worker in a job with a
likelihood of injury at about the labor market average earns 2–4
percent more than a person working in a totally safe job (see
Kniesner and Leeth 1995a, Chapter 3, and 1991b). The added
compensation firms must pay to entice workers to accept
employment in hazardous work sites gives firms an incentive to
expand their investments in safety programs. Employers weigh
the benefits of improved safety—smaller compensating wage
premiums, lower costs of purchasing WC, fewer work stoppages,
and smaller fines for violating OSHA health and safety
standards—against the costs of expanded safety programs. In
1998 firms paid more than $52 billion for WC and an estimated
$210 billion for compensating wage differentials to workers for
accepting some job hazards. By the end of the fiscal year, fines
assessed by OSHA, both federal and state, totaled only $132
million. At a ratio of nearly 2,000 to 1, the economic incentives
to improve safety by reducing compensating wage differentials
and WC expenses far surpass the safety-enhancing incentives
from the relatively small fines imposed by OSHA for violating its
standards.
For wage differentials to motivate them, workers need to
understand the work-related health risks for which they are being
compensated. Evidence indicates that workers do quit hazardous
jobs more frequently than relatively safe jobs (Viscusi 1992,
Chapter 6). Increases in the probability of an accident also raise
quit intentions and job searching, and reduce job tenure. One
estimate is that the learning that clarifies job risks may be
responsible for about one-third of all worker quits (Viscusi 1979).
Workers have fairly accurate information on the frequency of
workplace accidents and, even when they do not initially have the
correct impression of the hazards they will face on a job, workers
reevaluate their beliefs relatively quickly.
Some argue that health-related hazards are more difficult for
workers to evaluate than accident-related hazards and, in turn,
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market mechanisms such as wage premiums for hazardous
working conditions do not provide firms with the appropriate
motivation to eliminate or reduce health hazards. Workers
demonstrate some knowledge of risk by demanding the regularly
observed wage premiums for exposure to work-related health
risk. However, information users are not willing to compensate
private producers of basic research and information enough to
cover the underlying costs of creating the knowledge. Therefore,
the government will ideally play a role in trying to uncover and
disseminate information on the causes and consequences of
workplace health hazards.
Workers also reassess job-related hazards based on new
information. In one study, chemical workers who were told that
they would soon be working with sodium bicarbonate, a safe
chemical, reduced their assessment of workplace hazards by 50
percent. Workers who were told that they would be working with
either asbestos or TNT increased their assessments of workplace
hazards by 200 percent. No workers required extra compensation
to handle the safe sodium bicarbonate but workers demanded an
extra $3,000 to $5,000 per year to handle the dangerous asbestos
or TNT. No workers said they would quit their jobs because they
would be handling sodium bicarbonate but a majority of workers
said they would quit because they would be handling asbestos or
TNT (Viscusi and O’Connor 1984).
Although information can influence industrial safety by adjusting
workers’ risk perceptions and their willingness to work in a given
setting, the information must be presented in a way best
permitting informed judgments. Information overload can occur
if precautionary labels present too much data or if too many
products have precautionary labels. Warning workers against
relatively small risks, such as the risk of cancer from silica
(sand), may actually reduce workplace safety by convincing
workers that warning labels are irrelevant. A proliferation of
hazard warnings in the workplace will prove counterproductive if
workers are led to view all activities or products as equally
dangerous.
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Policy Recommendations
We close with specific recommendations for three of the pillars
of the U.S. safety policy system: OSHA, Workers’ Compensation
insurance, and tort law. The reforms we suggest would affect
both the federal and state governments and are recommendations
we believe are the most basic and likely to have the most impact
in the direction of improved safety incentives or cost savings
without reducing incentives to have a safer workplace. More in-
depth discussion of the policy reforms we outline here is
presented in Kniesner and Leeth (1991a, 1995b, and
forthcoming).
OSHA
An economically desirable direction for workplace safety policy
would be to continue to withdraw resources from OSHA overall,
coupled with an immediate revision of its current approach to
standard setting, inspections, and fines. In particular, Congress
should
• Reduce OSHA’s enforcement budget and redirect the funds to
NIOSH, which can use the funds to improve workplace safety
and health by researching the causes of industrial hazards and
diseases and by providing information and guidelines to firms
and workers concerning threshold levels of exposure to
dangerous substances or workplace practices.
Workers’ Compensation
As we have discussed throughout, state Workers’ Compensation
insurance provides firms with a powerful economic incentive to
improve workplace safety if insurance premiums are adequately
experience rated. States should
• Expand experience rating of WC insurance premiums to both
small and large firms, and structure rates to reflect both the
frequency and severity of injuries. WC premiums have two
components: a so-called manual rate, which reflects average
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claims for the entire industry, and an experience modification
factor, which reflects the individual firm’s safety record.
Primary losses (from high-frequency, low-severity injuries)
influence a firm’s experience modification factor, depending
on what is known as the firm’s credibility factor. Small firms
have low credibility factors and large firms have high ones,
meaning that additional injuries at a small firm will not have
as great an impact on its WC premiums as additional injuries
at a large firm. Furthermore, a single high-severity injury will
not raise a firm’s WC premium as much as several low-
severity injuries. To improve workplace safety, the
characteristics of WC that mimic a straightforward “tax on
injuries” should be strengthened.
• Clarify the link between premium levels and workplace
safety. Reducing fraudulent claims will tighten the link
between firms’ actual workplace safety and the insurance
premiums they pay, and thereby strengthen the safety
incentive in WC.
Tort Reform
State tort laws can ease workers’ abilities to sue employers for
damages and, likewise, provide firms with stronger economic
incentives to improve worker safety. States should also
• Allow employees to sue their employers for negligence in
cases of gross employer misconduct. WC covers workers
against losses caused by industrial accidents and some
diseases. Regardless of who is at fault, employers must fully
compensate employees for medical expenses and partially
compensate them for lost wages caused by work-related
injuries. In return, employees forgo their rights to sue
employers for full economic damages, including the cost of
pain and suffering, when injures occur. With the current
limited liability for damages, employers may under-invest in
safety programs. Permitting workers to sue for pain and
suffering would produce a more appropriate level of safety by
forcing employers to bear the complete cost of injuries. The
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fairness of the work-related disability insurance system would
also be improved by shifting an important cost of injury to the
party responsible. To avoid unduly increasing administrative
and court expenses, the right to sue should be strictly limited
to instances of gross employer misconduct.
Conclusion
We all would like safe jobs, just as we would like a clean
environment, no automobile deaths, and no crime. Unfortunately,
a riskless society is not easy to obtain. People generally are
unwilling to accept the severe restrictions on personal freedoms
plus the monumental economic expense needed to effect a
society free of all risks to personal health and safety.
Unlike the cartoon economist who is ridiculed for knowing the
price of everything and the value of nothing, we believe our
discussion has demonstrated that we are aware of both the price
of greater workplace safety and the value of greater workplace
safety. We contend that citizens generally favor a perspicacious
government where policy costs and benefits are concerned —
they want an efficient government, one that does not pay more
for something than necessary, including the cost of saving a
statistical life via regulation as opposed to other safety programs
(for a comprehensive cost-effectiveness study of life-saving
policies in the United States see Tengs et al. 1995).
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